

RGGI

Evolution of the Country's First CO₂ Trading Program: Opportunities and Challenges for the Future

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Andrea Okie Analysis Group, Inc. January 2017



Agenda

Overview of RGGI

- Structure
- How it has worked
- Economic impacts of RGGI

Coordination with the Clean Power Plan

Opportunities and Challenges



What is RGGI?

- First carbon cap-and-trade program in the U.S. to reduce CO₂
 - Includes nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states (+ New Jersey through 2011) covering ISO-NE, NYISO, and part of PJM
 - Covers fossil fuel power plants 25 MW or greater
 - Rights to emit CO₂ are sold via centralized quarterly auctions
 - Single cap, allocated among states and based loosely on historic emissions, with declining cap ratchet
 - Joint allowance tracking and trading
 - Central organization (RGGI Inc.) with coordinated governance
 - Auction proceeds remitted back to states
 - States determine how to spend proceeds





What is RGGI?

Key features of design and implementation

- Three year compliance period
 - First compliance period = 2009-2011
 - Second compliance period = 2012-2014
 - Third compliance period = 2015-2017
- Covered sources can bank allowance credits
 - Units must hold 50% of annual obligation
- Offsets allowed
 - Up to 3.3% of compliance obligation through qualified projects
- Reserve Price serves as a floor (\$1.86 in 2008; \$2.10 in 2016)
- Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) added in 2014 to provide additional allowances to be sold at auction if certain price thresholds are met
 - 2014: 5 million additional allowances at \$4/ton
 - 2015: 10 million additional allowances at \$6/ton



What is RGGI?


- Key features of design and implementation (cont'd.)
 - Leakage monitored but not enforced
 - Increases in emissions from non-covered sources may reduce emissions reductions from covered sources (e.g., electricity imported into RGGI states)
 - Periodic program reviews
 - 2012 Program Review
 - 2016 Program Review (for 2020-2030) currently underway
 - Single region-wide mass based cap for electric sector
 - Modified under 2012 Program Review, with adjustments for historical banked allowances; applicable through 2020
 - 2016 Program Review: additional reductions through 2030 (?)



RGGI CO₂ Cap Over Time

- Original cap constructed in 2005 and designed to stabilize CO2 emissions from 2009-2014 at predicted 2009 levels before requiring gradual reductions
- Actual emissions decreased substantially over predicted 2009 levels

Observed Emissions Compared to the Original Emissions Cap






RGGI Emissions Compared with Electricity Sales

- RGGI electricity sales decreased 5% between 2005 and 2011 while CO2 emissions from in-state electric generation decreased by 36%
- Suggests that structural factors other than temporal economic conditions played a role (e.g., EE improvements, changes in generation portfolio (coal to gas))

RGGI Emissions Compared with Electricity Sales






RGGI CO₂ Cap – Revised Emissions Cap

- Following 2012 Program Review, revised emissions cap put in place for 2014 and beyond. Emissions cap decreased by 2.5% annually thereafter through 2020.
- Revised cap also adjusted for substantial amount of banked emission allowances held by covered sources


Observed Emissions Compared to the Original and Revised Emissions Cap





RGGI Auction Proceeds and Clearing Prices


- Auctions began in Q3 2008: 34 auctions to date, with 860 million cumulative allowances sold generating \$2.6 billion in revenues
- CCR hit in March 2014 and Sept. 2015 auctions; recent prices are following downward trend (\$4.54 in Auction 33, \$3.55 in Auction 34)






Expenditure of RGGI Auction Proceeds

- States retain auction revenues and decide how to use them
 - MOU states agreed that at least 25% of emission allowance value would be allocated for a "consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose"
 - RGGI states greatly exceeded this commitment
 - Results for Compliance Period Two (2012-2014)









Source: Okie, Andrea et al. "The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States: Review of RGGI's Second Three Year Compliance Period (2012-2014)."

Clean Technology R&D

Energy Efficiency

Renewable Investment

■ Direct Bill Assistance

■ GHG Programs and Program Administration



Impacts of RGGI Auction Expenditures

Analysis Group study of Second Compliance Period (2012-2014)

Each quarter:

- The states auction off an amount of CO₂ allowances; generators purchase them
- States receive the revenues

In the wholesale electricity markets in each hour:

- Generators offer a price to supply power, including CO₂ allowance cost
- The grid operator dispatches power plants, using offer prices including CO₂ costs
- The hourly clearing price reflects the CO₂ costs of the 'marginal' power plant
- The dispatch order changes as a result of CO₂ costs: more carbon-intensive plants operate less; less carbon-intensive plants operate more
- Gas-fired generators tend to get their costs back; coal-fired plants recover some of their costs; and zero-carbon plants get a \$ boost


In the local economy:

- States spend the auction proceeds in various ways
- Consumers pay electricity prices reflecting (a) CO₂ costs and (b) the impact of any cost-reducing investments that result from states' use of auction proceeds



Impacts of RGGI Auction Expenditures


Run the \$ Through the Power System and the Economy....





Net Economic Impacts – All RGGI States (2012-2014, \$2015)

Direct, Indirect, and Induced Value Added Totals \$1.3B



Notes: Figures represent dollars discounted to 2015 using a 3% public discount rate.

Source: Okie, Andrea et al. "The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States: Review of RGGI's Second Three Year Compliance Period (2012-2014)."



Overall Economic Impacts – All RGGI States (2012-2014, \$2015)

- \$1.3 billion: economic value added in the region (NPV*)
- \$0.98 billion: Allowance auction proceeds 2012-2014
- \$0.45 billion: Consumer savings (electricity, heating customers) (NPV*)
- \$0.5 billion: Lower revenues to power plant owners (NPV*)
- \$1.27 billion: Fewer dollars spent on out-of-region fossil fuel (NPV*)
- 14,000 jobs created**

^{*} Using a 3% social discount rate, with value reflecting the 2012-2014 period, with tail-end effects of energy efficiency investment analyzed over a 10-year period.

^{**} Jobs = job years



Key Observations

- The design of the CO₂ market in the RGGI states affected the size, character, and distribution of public benefits
 - Decision by RGGI states to auction allowances transfers emission rights from public to private sector at a monetary cost
 - Retains value of allowances and generates substantial revenue for public use
 - Prevents transfer of that value to power plant owners
- The states have used CO2 allowance proceeds to support diverse policy & economic outcomes
 - Use of RGGI revenues has allowed states to meet a wide variety of social, fiscal, and environmental policy goals



Key Observations

- RGGI has functioned efficiently while delivering positive economic benefits
 - Program has integrated seamlessly into regional power markets
 - Reinvestment in local EE and other programs along with reductions in imports
 of fossil fuels for electricity generation has generated substantial net
 economic benefits for RGGI states
- States have retained full implementation authority, but have worked cooperatively for 10+ years through:
 - Regional program design and state legal/regulatory processes
 - Setting of cap; allocation of allowance pool
 - Auctioning of allowances, monitoring of market
 - Shared administration and governance
 - Major program redesign, including tightening of cap



Overview of Clean Power Plan

Targets CO₂ emissions from existing power plants

- Rule relies on authority asserted by EPA under section 111(d) of Clean Air Act
- Sets individual state targets for CO₂
 - Interim targets for 2022-2029
 - Final targets to be met by 2030
- Target for each state derived from a formula based on three "building blocks"
 - Building blocks: heat rate improvements to coal-fired EGUs; improved NGCC capacity factors; increases in renewable energy generation
 - Each state can reach its goal however it chooses, without needed to "comply" with assumptions in building blocks
- States submit individual State Implementation Plans to achieve targets
 - States can meet targets using a mass-based target (tons₂) or emissions ratebased target (tons CO₂/MWh) approach



Overview of Clean Power Plan

Current status


- August 2015: EPA promulgates final rule
- October 2015: Opponents of the rule (certain states, industry groups, utilities) states petition US Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit for a stay
- January 2016: DC Circuit Court declines to stay rule
- February 2016: Supreme Court issues stay of final rule until pending litigation is resolved
- September 2016: DC Circuit Court hears oral arguments
- ????: DC Circuit Court issues ruling; likely subsequent appeals to Supreme Court



Overview of Clean Power Plan

Current status

 States diverge over whether to proceed with compliance planning for CPP; some states moving forward while others suspend efforts



Supreme Court Stay Response



Source: E&E's Power Plan Hub, available at http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean power plan.



Opportunities Presented by CPP for RGGI

- States can meet their goals individually or collaborate with other states to create multistate plans
- Success of first two RGGI compliance periods has demonstrated:
 - Feasibility and value of multi-state approaches to controlling CO₂
 - Ability of states to work cooperative and effectively together (e.g., 2012
 Program Review and revisions to emissions cap)
 - RGGI states include differing political settings, different generation profiles, state industrial/commercial profiles
 - Ability of market-based allowance trading programs to help states control
 CO₂ emissions while generating positive economic benefits
 - Ability of allowance trading programs to operate seamlessly in wholesale markets, with no impact on power system reliability



Challenges Presented by CPP for RGGI

- RGGI based on mass-based emissions approach; states would need to adopt mass-based SIP for CPP compliance
- Differences in scope of affected sources: RGGI covers all (new and existing)
 CO₂ emitting EGUs; CPP covers existing sources only
 - Including only existing sources may shift generation from existing sources to new ones, creating emission leakage and distorting the carbon price signal in electricity markets
- Uncertain either the scope and stringency of RGGI would be sufficient to meet CPP's targets
 - RGGI's existing cap stops at 2020; CPP's requirements begin in 2022 and continue through 2030
 - CCR has the potential to provide up to 10 million of additional allowances each year, making analysis more challenging
- Some issues may be resolved coming out of 2016 Program Review



Contact

Andrea Okie, Vice President

617-425-8154 andrea.okie@analyisgroup.com




Appendix




Power Sector Modeling - PROMOD

Diagram of PROMOD Modeling Inputs and Outputs





Allowance Auction and Direct Sales Proceeds: \$0.98 billion (2012-2014) to the participating states




RGGI Inc.

igures include Auctions 1-26 and direct sales proceeds for New Jersey (2009) and Connecticut (2009/2010). α auction proceeds from Auctions 1 and 2 are reflected in the 2009 values.

lew Jersey does not have auction proceeds after Compliance Period 1.



Consumer Bill Reductions by Region (2015\$)




Notes: Figures include PROMOD outputs, non-electric benefit calculations, capacity market gain calculations, and direct bill assistance savings.

Figures represent dollars discounted to 2015 using a 3% public discount rate.



Net Revenue Change for Power Plant Owners (2015\$)



Notes: Figures include PROMOD outputs, allowance true-up calculations and capacity market loss calculations. Figures represent dollars discounted to 2015 using a 3% discount rate.



Net Economic Impact (2012-2014): By State

Co. and the	Value Added [1]	Employment [2]
State/Region	(\$2015 Millions)	(Cumulative job-years)
Connecticut	\$56.2	863
Maine	122.3	1,113
Massachusetts	243.3	2,718
New Hampshire	67.3	583
Rhode Island	16.6	195
Vermont	14.8	177
New England Subtotal	\$520.5	5,649
New York	\$385.5	4,463
New York Subtotal	\$385.5	4,463
Delaware	\$107.3	952
Maryland	213.8	2,475
RGGI States in PJM Subtotal	\$321.1	3,428
Regional Impact [3]	\$69.6	615
All RGGI States	\$1,296.7	14,155